THE
ARABISTS: The Romance of an American Elite, by Robert D. Kaplan. 333
pages, illustrated. Free Press paperback
Arabist
is a wonk word, not used in ordinary American.
In
essence neutral, indicating a westerner with special knowledge of the
Arabic language, it was turned into a slur meaning particularly a
Jew-hating (or despising) American diplomat who had “gone native”
and adopted the anti-Zionist attitudes of the Arabs among whom he had
spent many years.
Robert
Kaplan, a journalist with interests in the Middle East, tries to
reconstruct the evolution of the Arabists and to rehabilitate them,
in part. Not by denying that they were, largely, antisemitic
partisans; but by claiming that the situation was more complicated.
Not
much more complicated, on the evidence of this 1993 book, whose
hopeful conclusions – that the State Department's Arabists were
going to become better – turned out to be a bad prediction.
Arabists
seem to have had a love-despise attitude toward Arabs. Many people
have written about the romantic feelings inspired by the desert and
the warm feelings created by Arab courtesy. Less susceptible visitors
have observed the way Arabs treat women and animals and been less
impressed by formal courtesies; as, for example, romantics have
fallen for the gentility of the Old South while realists were
repelled by its brutality and cruelty.
More
than one Arabist seems to have loved Arabs while holding them in
contempt. One described learning the language as “opening the door
to an empty room.”
I
learned a lot from this book – based as it is on interviews with
active and retired Arabists – but I also had many serious problems
with what Kaplan left out.
American
Arabism originated with missionaries. Do-gooders, with whom Kaplan is
mightily impressed.
Their
experience in the Koran Belt, compared with, say, China, was unique.
Islam is a universalizing, salvationist monotheism, as is
Christianity; but Islam has a one-way view of proselytizing. It's
like the Hotel California. You can check in but you can never leave.
After
a generation or so, the missionaries realized they would never
convert any Moslems. Dedicated but sappy, they gave up and adopted
what Kaplan does not call a social gospel approach.
The
Middle East was treated as a gigantic Salvation Army aid station. If
they could not be given Christianity, the Moslems could be given
medical care, writing and printing, democratic instruction, efficient
agriculture and nationalism.
The
masses accepted the medical care without gratitude but proved
indifferent to farming, study, nationalism and democracy. A tiny film
of students got interested in nationalism, and for a time staffed the
bureaus and palaces of the faux-modern Arab states. They are now
being swept out by the real Moslems.
No
Arab Moslem was ever attracted by democracy.
It
was the fundamental failure of the Arabists, both before and after
Kaplan wrote this book, to imagine that they were. Much blather about
the Arab Spring in 2012 (and anticipations of it in “The Arabists”)
could have been avoided had these deluded specialists paid attention
to the Syrian political scientist Bassam Tibi, who states flatly that
Arabs are not interested in democracy.
Allah
knows there are enough indications of that truth in Kaplan's book,
although he does not draw the obvious conclusion: Alberto Fernandez,
a new generation Arabist, told Kaplan “self-determination is not
something the Arabs want to apply anywhere else in the Middle East”
except Israel and the areas it conquered in 1967.
Just
so.
The
missionaries, at least, had a reason for their delusions. As I said,
they tried to introduce modernist ideas into the Koran Belt. As
Kaplan does not realize, they were not themselves full moderns.
True,
as Americans they were skilled in the use of books and gadgets. But
every last one of them was also in thrall to the Book of Revelations.
It was probably this – their expectations about history – that
prevented them from quitting the area when their purpose became
obviously impossible.
That
is, the missionaries, whatever their skills and good intentions, were
all half-crazy (some way more than half).
It
is not a good idea to base a nation's foreign policy on a bedrock of
half-craziness. The 20th-century Arabists were free of this delusion,
but the circle turned in 2003, when a bunch of fundamentalist Texas
yahoos grabbed power in America.
Kaplan
ends his book worrying about the collision of American policy with
Baathist, secular, modernism in Iraq, which he considers the nadir of
Arabist influence – Gulf War I.
It
was the Koran Belt. Things could always get worse.
When
the antimodernists of the Bible Belt collided with the antimodernists
of the Koran Belt in 2003, things got worse than even the worst
pessimists imagined in 1993.