I used to think, when I was a very young business reporter, that no really big corporation would ever manage itself into oblivion. I thought then that a $100 billion corporation -- which was as big as the biggest got then -- would always be able to afford good management.
I was wrong. I did not understand then what an older business reporter was trying to tell me when he said companies choose directors according to whom the existing directors play golf with.
It took me even longer to learn that corporations do not even value good management. They would far rather have managers who are comfortable to get along with than managers who are able to do their jobs. (This explains, in part, their refusal to put brown people or women at the top.)
Take Boeing. Please.
Has there ever been a clearer example of incompetence?
If I were a plaintiffs lawyer taking depositions in the Max cases, I'd ask, did Boeing have an acceptable limit of crashes with the 737 Max? If so what was the limit?
We know the answer to the first question is yes. And we know the answer to the second question is more than two.
The rarity of contact with terrain events these days appears to have blinded managers to the significance of any such event. Barring a shoot down, every crash should be all hands on deck incident.
That was not how Boeing responded to the loss of a few score Indonesians. 'Nothing to see folks, move along.'
The fact that pilots were reporting continual failures with he autopilot -- both to the formal NASA reporting system and to the informal crowd sourcing system -- did not either bother Boeing's leadership or cause it to wonder if perhaps it had a problem. (Another question I'd ask in depositions: did Boeing monitor the crowd sourced reports? My guess is the answer to that one is no. The Boeing claim that it adheres to industry standards is telling: Boeing is a monopoly. Industry standards are Boeing standards, and it is evident that the marketing department -- which controls policy -- did not want to know about problems. Marketing departments never do.)
Following the crash in Africa it was evident to everyone except Boeing management and the Federal Aviation Administration that there was a problem. Boeing and the FAA stoutly insisted there was no proven or evidently even any hypothesized similarity in the two crashes although there was at least one: both involved contact with terrain.
It did not occur to the geniuses operating Boeing that if there really was no causal similarity in the two crashes, Boeing had not one but two serious safety failures on its hands
Instead it acted like it did not have any. The FAA, playing the role of Pontius Pilate to Dennis Muilenburg's Caiaphas, also insisted that it had not noticed any incidents that required it to do anything
Boeing continues to maintain it cannot imagine any connection between the two contacts with terrain.
We know why the company won't consider a connection and why the FAA was also reluctant. After all, half a trillion dollars is the biggest sales deal in history.
Why interfere with the good thing when there's money to be made?
We do not know yet if there were any consequential similarities between the crashes aside from contact with terrain, although extensive news reporting has suggested a number of possible scenarios about how there might be, given Boeing's desperation to outsell Airbus. Its corporate policy -- which is obviously not what Muilenburg's mealymouthed statement says it is -- that a few dead customers is no big deal; and its reputation as one of the most corrupt American corporations (the most corrupt nonfinancial corporation) explain why it blew off safety questions, but we must look somewhere else for an explanation of why it made its bet-the-company mistakes following the Lion crash and numerous other critical failures.
Still it should not have required a billion dollar executive to figure out that every step that Boeing has taken since the Lion Air crash offered the company nearly unlimited downside against very small upsides. Perhaps CEOs, like medieval kings (another class of overpaid and incompetent bosses), should keep a jester to prompt them whenever they're doing something more than usually silly.
UPDATE Tuesday
Just keep 'em flying. What could go wrong?
Harry, you and Keith Olbermann must be twins separated at birth. Both of you are so hate-addled you can no longer manage basic reasoning.
ReplyDeleteBoeing continues to maintain it cannot imagine any connection between the two contacts with terrain.
I have taken you to task many times for failing to provide substantiation, or having done that, it failing to support your wild allegations.
Just so here. I read the entire article. Twice. Couldn't find even the slightest hint that Boeing "… cannot imagine any connection between the two contacts with terrain."
So you have two options here. Provide the statement I somehow missed or admit your error.
Or pick the journalist option — prevaricate, then scarper.
UPDATE Tuesday
Just keep 'em flying. What could go wrong?
For those of you at home in the blogging audience, by "Just keep 'em flying", what Harry meant to say is that the FAA has granted permission for one-time ferry flights of empty airplanes to airports with long-term storage facilities.
Its corporate policy -- which is obviously not what Muilenburg's mealymouthed statement says it is -- that a few dead customers is no big deal
Congratulations. You have gone full Olbermann. That is not a compliment.
There is a great deal you do not understand here, and will certainly refuse to learn.
Boeing has complete confidence -- or said it did, so that's the source of the 'no connection' statement. And in sworn testimony we now have Boeing admitting it didn't tell pilots about the antistall device.
ReplyDeleteBoeing has complete confidence -- or said it did, so that's the source of the 'no connection' statement. And in sworn testimony we now have Boeing admitting it didn't tell pilots about the antistall device.
ReplyDeleteNonsense.
It could well be that MCAS failure was involved in both accidents. That doesn't mean Boeing can't imagine any connection, nor that assumptions about MCAS during the design process turned out to be false.
The primary one being that all pilots would be well enough trained to react to inappropriate MCAS inputs as an instance of uncommanded pitch trim -- a very easily handled abnormal.
Additionally, there is another element of both crews responses that is very puzzling: the best response, besides knowing that a NNC for uncommanded pitch trim exists, is to slow down. The force that the horizontal stabilizer can impose on the airframe is proportional to the square of the true airspeed.
Yet both mishap crews flew far faster than they had to, particularly the Ethiopian crew.
As for not telling pilots about the device, that is an interesting, but not necessarily wrong decision. MCAS only operates under extremely rare circumstances, in such a way that it is invisible to the pilots. And when it fails, its impact is no different than any other instance of uncommanded pitch trim.
And it is worth noting, although you didn't, that the loudest possible mention of MCAS -- the Lion Air crash -- somehow wasn't sufficient notice for the Ethiopian crew.
There are tradeoffs between complexity and reliability. Boeing focussed on reliability in the actual occurrence of low power stall, assuming that malfunctions would be properly handled.
To put this down to some drive to save money or make sales is ignorant. The cost difference between various implementations is nil, as was the cost of adding MCAS to the aircraft systems manual.
AAAnnnndddd ... crickets.
ReplyDeleteYet Boeing did charge American dollars for this costless problem. So you have proven my point about marketing.
ReplyDeleteWhen I wrote my post I did not know about the China Air Airbus 300 crash in which (if an uncontrolled background system is indeed the problem in the Boeing crashes) the design flawwas exactly the same. Which wasallegedly corrected over 30 yearsago.
So much for 'industry standards.'
Perhaps the Ethiopian pilots trusted Boeing's statement was honest.
Yet Boeing did charge American dollars for this costless problem. So you have proven my point about marketing.
ReplyDeleteYet you are wallowing in your own ignorance.
The China A300 mishap was a perfect example, as is the Korean crash at SFO, of pilots completely failing to handle an easy problem, because they didn't understand that the airplane was doing exactly what they told it to do. Whether it was training, experience, or culture (an issue of particularly deadly importance for Asian airlines) is immaterial.
Putting the airplane into the Go Around mode has consequences that any professional aviator must know. Just a month ago, on final into Paris, we suffered a flap asymmetry. Had to discontinue the approach. Hit the GA switch, then intended to select Altitude Hold, but hit Heading Hold instead.
Silly me.
But because of rigorous training in the US, I shut off the autopilot, hand flew the airplane into pitch and attitude parameters I needed, re-selected the AP and because I knew the wake-up modes of the AP, re-selected the heading to what ATC needed, and left the vertical speed alone.
Much of which should be gibberish to you. What is important, though, is that I knew exactly what the GA mode entails, and how to manage that. The China Airlines guys did not. No design flaw there, and hasn't been "corrected" because going from approach to go around modes has unavoidable consequences.
This issue isn't about marketing. It is about ongoing decisions about what to present pilots about operating the airplane. Back in the DC9/B727 et al days, flight manuals were pretty simple. Adding Flight Management Systems resulted in something like an order of magnitude more complexity.
Consequently, real decisions have to be made about how much material pilots must have at their immediate disposal.
Until last month, I had never had a discontinued approach. Ever. Yet when that rare event happened, I had to have all the relevant information at my immediate disposal.
Obviously, there has to be a line somewhere that defines what pilots must be able to quickly recall from that which doesn't matter enough.
Remember the American Airlines A300 crash in late 2001?
In response to a shallow angle crossing of a preceding B747's wake turbulence, the pilot used rudder to counteract the severe roll moments. He was an ex-fighter pilot; for fighters, that is the correct response.
Not so for airliners, as sequential rudder reversals can [insert aerodynamics lecture here] rip the vertical stabilizer right off the airplane.
That wasn't included in any airliner flight manual.
Now it is in all of them.
This isn't a marketing issue. This isn't a cost issue.
This is all about trying to draw a line between what pilots must know (and it is, at this point, at least arguable these crews weren't sufficiently aware of un-annunciated non-normal conditions) immediately, and that which is interesting but non-critical.
Pro-tip: stop making blanket accusations in fields about which you are ignorant. Makes you look a fool
Boeing did not think that it was needful for pilots to know about MCAST but it did charge for the system that would have made that knowledge unnecessary (or less necessary). I read your animadversions about fly-by-wire. So that was marketing; avionics did not make that decision or set that price.
ReplyDeleteSo i'm right and you are wrong
Boeing did not think that it was needful for pilots to know about MCAST but it did charge for the system that would have made that knowledge unnecessary (or less necessary).
ReplyDeleteWrong, Harry. Not that Boeing didn't charge for an additional AOA readout, but rather that it had any impact on MCAS. It didn't.
Adding onside AOA to the Primary Flight Display allows the pilots to compare AOA readings, but there are other, just as obvious means to determine AOA (Difference between IRU generated flight path vector and pitch attitude; airspeed, pitch attitude, climb rate. This is basic piloting stuff.)
Having that additional display would not have had any impact on the inability of those two crews to follow the required non-normal checklist -- although it would have taken me about two seconds of uncommanded pitch trim for me to shut the thing off, and refer to the checklist later.
Nor instructed them in basic airmanship. Trim problem? SLOW DOWN.
Read the final report on AF447. Training matters. Ab initio pilots are over-represented in mishaps. Korean Air at SFO. Turkish Air at AMS. China Air cited above.
So i'm right and you are wrong
Harry, on this subject you are so ignorant that your ravings aren't even wrong.
Boeing sold airplanes that fly themselves into the ground. Even if the pilots are resistant.
ReplyDeleteAnd Boeing sold the planes with the pitch that the pilots wouldn't need much (if any) of that expansive training.
That was marketing.
My original questions were 1. was Boeing prepared to accept contact with terrain events? and 2. how many?
Yes and more than 2. You can yammer about piloting all you want but you cannot get around that. That's history. We saw what Boeing did
My original questions were 1. was Boeing prepared to accept contact with terrain events? and 2. how many?
ReplyDeleteYes and more than 2. You can yammer about piloting all you want but you cannot get around that. That's history. We saw what Boeing did
Stop channeling your inner Olbermann. Boeing designed MCAS to reduce the likelihood of stalls (which are already extremely rare events). In order to ensure the system would work as required during an event so rare virtually all airframes go their entire service lives without experiencing one, they made the system simple, relying on a part that itself almost never fails.
In forty years of flying, I have never experienced an AOA failure.
Perhaps, in retrospect, Boeing should have documented MCAS. But with the second mishap, it is hard to see how that would have made any difference. Perhaps, in retrospect, Boeing should have limited MCAS control authority, but they based their design on timely and appropriate pilot reactions to system malfunctions.
That isn't yammering on about piloting, that is an indispensable part of the whole system. For reasons I can't fathom, both these crews reacted inappropriately, and lost what were otherwise easily dealt with situations.
Instead of foam-flecking your monitor in Boeing's direction -- making accusations that are utterly fact free -- how about pondering why these crews couldn't handle a simple situation.
The answer to your original question is no, and zero.
The head of the American Airlines' pilots' union disagrees with you.
ReplyDeleteBoeing should have documented the system, since many pilots have said they didn't know it existed. It is hard to switch off a system if you don't know it exists.
One thing that would have surprised me was that the coconut wireless didn't spread the word more effectively, but once you know that pilots don't talk to pilots, it becomes more understandable.
The head of the American Airlines' pilots' union disagrees with you.
ReplyDeleteYou really need to provide a quote here. I've read what he said, and I don't see anywhere that he disagrees with me. NB: I have no settled opinion on whether Boeing should have included MCAS documentation -- I can see valid arguments both ways.
Boeing should have documented the system, since many pilots have said they didn't know it existed. It is hard to switch off a system if you don't know it exists.
Your reading comprehension is awful. How many times in this thread have I stated perfectly clearly that an MCAS fault is an instance of uncommanded primary pitch trim, and the answer is the same regardless of the cause?
For pete's sake, if you can't get that through your Olbermann field, there is no hope.
One thing that would have surprised me was that the coconut wireless didn't spread the word more effectively, but once you know that pilots don't talk to pilots, it becomes more understandable.
You really should stop spouting ignorance this epic.
Maybe you should start drafting your apology post now; you're going to need it.
ReplyDelete'Boeing’s anti-stall software on a doomed Ethiopian Airlines jet re-engaged up to four times after the crew initially turned it off due to suspect data from an airflow sensor, two people familiar with the matter have said.
'It was not immediately clear whether the crew had chosen to redeploy the system, which pushes the nose of the Boeing 737 Max downwards, but one person with knowledge of the situation said investigators were studying the possibility that the software had kicked in again without human intervention.'
My son-on-law, who flies 737s for Delta, tells me he never flies with the same pilot twice. In circumstances like that, where you have no way of evaluating the capacity of the other pilot -- but you know that, statistically, on some flights he will be on alcohol or drugs, slipping into madness etc. -- you'd better have your protocols airtight.
Still waiting for your apology:
ReplyDeletehttps://www.nytimes.com/2019/04/04/world/asia/ethiopia-crash-boeing.html?action=click&module=Top%20Stories&pgtype=Homepage
Harry, how does MCAS change the position of the horizontal stabilizer?
ReplyDeleteUntil you can answer that question, you need to be much less demanding of apologies.
Pro-tip: expecting journalists to ask and answer that obvious question is a fool’s errand.
My son-on-law, who flies 737s for Delta, tells me he never flies with the same pilot twice. In circumstances like that, where you have no way of evaluating the capacity of the other pilot -- but you know that, statistically, on some flights he will be on alcohol or drugs, slipping into madness etc. -- you'd better have your protocols airtight.
ReplyDeleteThey are called standards, and they are extensive and rigorous. And airline standards departments frequently work with others' departments to look for better practices.
Statistical in this case means a number near as dammit to zero.
The final determination is not in and will not be for some time, but the circumstances are suggestive, like -- as Thoreau once put it -- finding a trout in the milk
ReplyDeleteWatch this. That is what MCAS was actuating. At the bottom is the primary trim motor -- if it has no power, it doesn't matter what MCAS is doing.
ReplyDeleteSo I don't think I owe an apology. If so, please explain.
The final determination is not in ...
Exactly.
Shame you didn't think of that when you wrote:
If I were a plaintiffs lawyer taking depositions in the Max cases, I'd ask, did Boeing have an acceptable limit of crashes with the 737 Max? If so what was the limit?
We know the answer to the first question is yes. And we know the answer to the second question is more than two.
Then read this:
ReplyDeleteMCAS normalises a stick force gradient that does not fully meet the applicable certification standard § 25.173 Static longitudinal stability, sub paras a through d. It is not a stall prevention mechanism. Stall warning requirements are specified in § 25.207 Stall warning and for handling in § 25.203 Stall characteristics. Compliance with the latter is exhibited in demonstration compliant with § 25.201 Stall demonstration. The lifting body effect of the engines is a non linear effect, at a modest relative inflow angle, they will develop lift, at high angles that lift increment will not occur, and inertial forces will dominate the aircrafts behaviour, weight is still forward of the Cp, the plane will pitch down at the break #.
The non linear stick force gradient issue is not permitted to be so significant that the failure of the augmentation system precludes flight within the operational envelope, and specifically up to the stall. § 25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems.
In simple terms, the control force in part of the operating envelope, outside of normal flight conditions experienced by the RPT pilot, but within the full flight envelope did not meet the standard that was set half a century ago, in a time where the automation and instrumentation would have made it unacceptable to fly for a period of time an aircraft that had say the same control forces as a Lancair 360, and which are still more applicable to IFR operation than a Pitts or an Extra. The Lancair, Pitts and Extra can easily be flown by instruments, it is just undesirable for long term comfort, and therefore the system safety. To remove the issue, Bill Boeing added the MCAS, which is a variant of the STS that has been there for years on the SLUF, dealing with a similar issue in a small part of the envelope around retracting flaps and initial acceleration, e.g., 3rd segment.
Bingle 1.0 is understandable in part, the guys didn't have much heads up other than the info in the tech log, unless there was a side bar discussion by engineering or the preceding sectors crew in what they found. Bingle 2.0 highlights the fact that a crew that had been briefed on the issue, still had the same sort of outcome. Crew 1.0 did contain the problem for a period, with the Captain frequently retrimming the aircraft against the MCAS input. On handing over the plane to the FO apparently, that trim intervention got lost and the trim ran down under MCAS to a bad outcome.
When we understand why the first crew could not reconcile the stab motion with an effective run away and flick the cut out switches, we will have a better knowledge of humans making decisions under uncertainty, and with cognitive and temporal stressors. When we understand how a crew briefed on the problem emulate the same outcome, then maybe we will be able to have a safer flight deck than we apparently have now.
The stability issue is an irritant, the cure as implemented led to 2 trained crews losing it.
ReplyDeleteFor the news media etc, please stop referring to MCAS and stall prevention, it has precious little to do with stall.
Reference:
§ 25.672 Stability augmentation and automatic and power-operated systems.
If the functioning of stability augmentation or other automatic or power-operated systems is necessary to show compliance with the flight characteristics requirements of this part, such systems must comply with § 25.671 and the following:
(a) A warning which is clearly distinguishable to the pilot under expected flight conditions without requiring his attention must be provided for any failure in the stability augmentation system or in any other automatic or power-operated system which could result in an unsafe condition if the pilot were not aware of the failure. Warning systems must not activate the control systems.
(b) The design of the stability augmentation system or of any other automatic or power-operated system must permit initial counteraction of failures of the type specified in § 25.671(c) without requiring exceptional pilot skill or strength, by either the deactivation of the system, or a failed portion thereof, or by overriding the failure by movement of the flight controls in the normal sense.
(c) It must be shown that after any single failure of the stability augmentation system or any other automatic or power-operated system -
(1) The airplane is safely controllable when the failure or malfunction occurs at any speed or altitude within the approved operating limitations that is critical for the type of failure being considered;
(2) The controllability and maneuverability requirements of this part are met within a practical operational flight envelope (for example, speed, altitude, normal acceleration, and airplane configurations) which is described in the Airplane Flight Manual; and
(3) The trim, stability, and stall characteristics are not impaired below a level needed to permit continued safe flight and landing.
[Amdt. 25-23, [url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/rio/citation/35_FR_5675]35 FR 5675 Apr. 8, 1970]
# A nacelle develops lift from a mix of normal circulation theory lift, and some vortex structure lift. The main lift effect will arise from the vortex structure, and that is non linear, with a startup at modest AOA of the nacelle, to a peak around 15 AOA or thereabouts, and a slow drop off of lift to AOA around 25. At higher AOA, the vortex structures fail and lift drops off, with drag being the main component affecting the resultant force couples to the aircraft structure. Normal circulation related lift is limited in total derived force. As an aside, the vanes often placed on the nacelles affect the shedding structure off the nacelle with slat/Kruegers extended at modest to high AOA. They result in a substantial recovery of CsubL for the section of the wing behind the nacelle, and give something nice to watch on humid days.
There are two takeaways here.
1. Airplane certification is extremely complex
2. This information is open source, yet the NYT journalists give no sign they bothered looking for it.
Sorry, three takeaways.
3. Gell-Mann Amnesia Effect.
Let me state the obvious: Boeing's management strategy -- like the broccoli farmer Bret referred to -- is just the Fail-Safe Hotel syndrome.
ReplyDeleteIt costs money to build a plane that flies itself, but it costs nothing to say a plane flies itself.
Let me state the obvious: Boeing's management strategy -- like the broccoli farmer Bret referred to -- is just the Fail-Safe Hotel syndrome.
ReplyDeleteLet me state the obvious: you have no earthly idea what you are talking about, and refuse to learn.
When did Boeing say the Max flew itself? Or are you just scratching your slander reflex?
Just re-read the post. It is slander from top to bottom, even beyond your normal standards.
Let's review the bidding:
ReplyDeleteBoeing management is the clearest example of incompetence (leaving aside the minor matter of building, by a fair margin, the most successful airliner of all time).
That Boeing had some number of crashes it was willing to accept, rather than take measures to prevent them.
Boeing management doesn't care about the deaths of Indonesians.
Boeing standards are industry standards.
That the crashes were due to manifest, and obvious, negligence on Boeing's part.
Boeing denied any connection between the two crashes.
Boeing views a few dead customers is no big deal, and it blew off safety questions.
And that every response offered unlimited downside compared to limited upside.
You fail to comprehend that all airplanes will fly themselves into the ground when something goes wrong and the pilots to do not react appropriately.
And, inexplicably, you somehow put faith in MSM journalists to have even the first clue about aviation matters.
Do me a favor and read this. Not just because of the information, but that the story is the result of that rarest of birds: a journalist doing actual, in depth, inventive, reporting.
Then read this.
Which should give you good reason to ponder what your reaction will be when the mishap final report finds the airplane was properly certified, and that the main cause of both mishaps was inadequate systems knowledge, and, consequently, the inability of both crews to correctly deal with a simple malfunction.
After which you should hang your head in shame.
You won't.
Boeing lied. That's already proven. You're just bluffing becruse you backed yourself into a corner. And it was already famous as the most corrupt industrial concern in America
ReplyDeleteWhat did Boeing lie about?
ReplyDeleteThat the Max would fly like the 737, that no simulator training was necessary, that it would fly itself out of a stall, that the avionics had been validated
ReplyDeleteOnce again, you are showing your incomprehension.
ReplyDeleteStart with the last: that the avionics had been validated
They had been.
... that it would fly itself out of a stall.
Boeing never claimed what MCAS is explicitly not designed to do. The many links I have provided, plus my explanations should have made that clear. MCAS was designed to make the MAX fly like previous 737s when at angles of attack approaching a stall.
... that no simulator training was necessary...
It wasn't. Did you look at The Atlantic story Iinked?
That the Max would fly like the 737...
It does.
Yet despite that, we have two crashes on our hands.
Perhaps you should consider other reasons why.
Here is some actual information to go on.
ReplyDeleteAaannnnddddd ... crickets.
ReplyDeleteNo surprise.
Oh, and how is Boeing the most corrupt industrial organization in America?
ReplyDeleteYou're in the Air Force Reserve, you know about Boeing's corruption.
ReplyDeleteSo now that the preliminary report has shown you wrong in every regard, can we look forward to you apologizing for your slanders?
ReplyDeleteNo, it showed you were wrong in assuming the pilots did not know how to turn off MCAS. Boeing was right in claiming the plane would fly itself, only they didn't say it would fly itself into the ground.
ReplyDeleteBollocks, Harry.
ReplyDeleteIt took them something like two minutes — go ahead, Harry, stare at your watch for that long — to figure out what to do. Any runaway trim situation, no matter its cause, would have put them in the dirt.
And there is more wrong to come: they failed to fly the plane. Only incompetent pilots allow the airplane to accelerate to redline — 100 knots faster than max allowable at that altitude. That is what crashed the plane.
And there is more wrong. The only way the airplane got that fast, aside from a gross lack of pilot skill, is mismanaging the auto thrust system, likely coupled with incorrectly flying the departure procedure.
They gooned up a simple situation. Just like AF447 happened because the pilots gooned up a simple situation.
Your Bolshevik compulsion to blame Boeing means you couldn’t possibly think this through to questioning why a plane that was correctly certified still crashed twice.
First step: admit you are engaging in pointless slander.
Then I’ll provide you a theory far more in contact with reality.
Okay, so it appears you are completely disinterested in the facts.
ReplyDeleteNo surprise, you are a journalist, after all.
BTW, both crews managed to crash completely flyable airplanes.