During the period of my move over the summer I was not able to post to Restating the Obvious very often, but one of the things that struck me forcibly was the treatment of the word and concept of treason, starting with James Clapper's ill-advised use of the term following the Helsinki embarrassment when Trump traveled thousands of miles to lick Putin's boots.
Clapper knew better. Trump's performance did not in any way meet the constricted definition of treason in our Constitution. Traitorous would've suited as well and been legally accurate.
The right-wingers jumped on Clapper's error, and that sent me down memory lane because the use of the word treason has been habitual with right-wingers and Republicans all my life, and I do believe that the same Constitution was in effect in 1952 as in 2018.
It's been a gift to a person of my sentiments that Republicans have continued since Helsinki to use the treason word.
It is always a question with our right-wingers whether they are pig-ignorant or are as knowledgable about our political history as I am but far more cynical. I can never decide. They are certainly stupid but that is not the same as being ignorant, and they're certainly cynical.
They must believe -- if they're not just ignorant -- that virtually all of their supporters are completely ignorant, because you do not have to know great deal about American political history to remember the Republican Party's campaign slogan in the 1952 election: 20 years of treason.
Clapper knew better. Trump's performance did not in any way meet the constricted definition of treason in our Constitution. Traitorous would've suited as well and been legally accurate.
ReplyDeleteWhat, exactly, did Trump do that was traitorous?
It is always a question with our right-wingers whether they are pig-ignorant or are as knowledgable about our political history as I am but far more cynical. I can never decide. They are certainly stupid but that is not the same as being ignorant,
It is always a question with you, whether you are pig-ignorant, or willfully stupid. There might not be a difference.
But what is unquestionable is that when a subject matter expert offered to relieve your stampeding ignorance, you declined.
And what else is also obvious is that you provided an excellent example of passive-aggressive hatred.
Actually, Skipper, you didn't. For example, review your response to my comment about reconnaissance by fire.
ReplyDeleteI had more, such as the bombing of eastern Cambodia by B52s, whose explosion pattern was 800 yards long, in an area where settlements are less than 800 yards apart.
In other words, every drop hit a helpless and inoffensive village.
I uppose the subject-matter experts knew that.
Murderers.
Harry, instead of my trying to keep up with your supersonic goal posts, how about we take your trail of errors from the top --
ReplyDeleteNo. 1 Rule of combat aviation: If you go low enough and slow enough to aim, you don't come back. So don't aim.
-- and work from there.
I'm a subject matter expert. I am willing to alleviate your ignorance.
No surprise. You prefer ignorant pronunciamentos over getting a chance to learn something.
ReplyDeleteAir power turned out to be a fraud. -- putting a bomb in a pickle barrel from 30,000 feet and all that. You have to ignore a great deal of history to think otherwise
ReplyDeleteHow about we stop at the top:
ReplyDeleteNo. 1 Rule of combat aviation: If you go low enough and slow enough to aim, you don't come back. So don't aim.
Not only is this nasty — not surprising for a progressive — and monumentally passive-aggressive, it is also conceptually confused and betrays an astonishing ignorance of cause and effect.
First with the conceptual confusion. Of course the Norden bombsight couldn't put a bomb in a pickle barrel — imperfect ballistics would make that impossible no matter how good the bombsight. But aiming and hitting are two different things. Smooth bore muskets are notoriously inaccurate, but no one would accuse 17th century soldiers of not aiming.
At least, not anyone with any sense.
Just so with the B-17:J
In practice it was not possible to achieve [75 foot circular error probable (CEP)] in combat conditions, with the average CEP in 1943 of 370 metres (1,200 ft) being similar to Allied and German results. Both the Navy and Air Forces had to give up on the idea of pinpoint attacks during the war.
CEP is a statistical measure — the radius of a circle (actually, an ellipse oriented along the flight path) within which 50% of the bombs will fall.
Okay, pickle barrels are relatively safe. But factories are not pickle barrels, they are area targets the size of which can be as large as the CEP. That high altitude bombing isn't suitable for point targets doesn't mean there aren't suitable targets for high altitude bombing.
Which highlights your historical ignorance. (Or rather, your hatred and arrogance blinds you to any conclusion which you do not already hold.)
The Nazis eventually put their aircraft production under ground. Is that because high altitude bombing was ineffective? The Luftwaffe had practically ceased to exist by the time of the Normandy invasion. Why is that? Were the German's so stupid that they wasted their air defenses against fraudulent B-17s and B-24s?
I predict you will confront neither of those fundamental effects, because to do so would require you to rethink your cherished shibboleths.
There is a great deal more about which you were epically wrong, but this will do for now.
You've never been in a factory, have you?
ReplyDeleteIn Europe, the strategic air forces made 5 all-out attacks against factories in Schweinefurt, Ploesti and Peenemunde. 4 resulted in serious losses to the attackers and all 5 failed to affect the targets. (The only one that did not result in high losses to the attackers missed the target entirely.)
You've never been in a factory, have you?
ReplyDeleteOther than having worked in one, no.
You continue to miss the point. Sure, it is possible to pick out attacks that failed.
But if they were the rule, then there is absolutely no explaining the Nazis moving aircraft production underground, or the fact that the Luftwaffe had almost ceased to exist by D-Day.
So, start there. Explain how those two consequences have no cause. There are plenty more like them, but those two will still do for now.
Failed disastrously. At great cost. The first Ploesti attack nearly ruined the 15th Air Force. The refineries were back in production within hours.
ReplyDeleteYeah, no explaining these things. Why did the Russians move 1,500 factories to the Urals, although the Germans had no strategic air force. Heck, the American aircraft factories in Burbank were elaborately camouflaged, presumably to protect them from the Mexican air force.
Why did the Russians move 1,500 factories to the Urals, although the Germans had no strategic air force.
ReplyDeleteWhy do you insist on equating things that are entirely different
The Russians moved 1500 factories east of the Urals because the Germans were rapidly invading their territory. The Russians expected Moscow to fall. Stalingrad did fall, and Leningrad was under siege.
That bears no resemblance to the German homeland which, when they put their aircraft factories underground, wasn't facing a threat of invasion. Just as the German Air Force was rendered ineffective before D-Day.
Stop the prevarication. Explain the cause of those effects.
The German invasion of the Soviet Union is no help here, other than suggesting your knowledge of WWII is, at best, superficial.
Just to emphasize your conceptual confusion.
ReplyDeleteMoving factories keeps them out of the reach of an invasion, but is pointless against airpower.
Putting factories underground keeps the out of the reach of airpower, but is pointless against an invasion.
So you might want to rethink your last comment.
You obviously have never worked in a factory. Even small, inaccurate raids disrupt production, so it is worthwhile to move underground, unless . . . unless bombing is accurate, in which case the underground factory would soon be entombed. The Germnas did not waste 2 seconds worrying about that since by then everybody knew that air forces did not aim snd hit targets only by hsppenstance
ReplyDeleteunless . . . unless bombing is accurate, in which case the underground factory would soon be entombed.
ReplyDeleteNonsense, Harry. Pure, unadulterated, ignorant nonsense.
Tunnel entries are small, and easy to hide.
The reason that the Germans moved their aircraft (and V-2/V-1) factories underground is that they wouldn't survive above ground.
But wait, there is still more wrong to be had. IF you had read the Strategic Bombing Survey, which you clearly didn't, you would have learned two things. First, factories are far harder to knock out than planners thought, which had a follow on consequence: lack of persistence against individual targets.
It was the lack of persistence, not failure to hit the factories, that made daylight strategic bombing less effective than it could have been.
Also, I can't help but notice you haven't explained why the Germans wasted essentially their entire air force against bombers that they knew did not aim, and hit their targets only by happenstance.
Not so easy to conceal a rail line leading to a cave.
ReplyDeleteLack of persistence? So those raids didn't damage the targets? That's what I said.
Factories are big places with only small areas of critical targets. The RAF and USAAF could not hit those spots, except by happenstance.
And those air raids were not without costs.
Pro-tip: airplane assemblies do not require trains for transport.
ReplyDeletePro-tip 2: Persistence and damage are two entirely different concepts. That you think they are related is a symptom of your confusion.
And here we sit, with you still stuck with uncaused effects.
Google [youtube Victor Davis Hansen air].
Since you are the least intellectually curious person I have ever met, except for every other progressive, I doubt you will, But in case you do, it will put paid to entire swaths of your ignorance.
Oh, and you would be wise to not confine your analysis to factories. You have completely ignored both petroleum, particularly distillates, and transportation:
ReplyDeleteDespite its successes, by the spring of 1944 the Combined Bomber Offensive had failed to severely damage the German economy or significantly interrupt production of a vital item. The oil campaign was the first to accomplish these goals.[32] The US strategic bombing survey identified "catastrophic" damage.[20] Of itself, German industry was not significantly affected by attacks on oil targets as coal was its primary source of energy. And in its analysis of strategic bombing as a whole the USSBS identified the consequences of the breakdown of transportation resulting from attacks against transportation targets as "probably greater than any other single factor" in the final collapse of the German economy.[33]
Several prominent Germans, however, described the oil campaign as critical to the defeat of Nazi Germany. Adolf Galland, Inspector of Fighters of the Luftwaffe until relieved of command in January 1945, wrote in his book "the most important of the combined factors which brought about the collapse of Germany",[34] and the Luftwaffe's wartime leader, Hermann Göring, described it as "the utmost in deadliness".[19]:287 Albert Speer, writing in his memoir, said that "It meant the end of German armaments production."[4]:412–4 It has been stated to have been "effective immediately, and decisive within less than a year".[35] Luftwaffe Field Marshal Erhard Milch, referring to the consequences of the oil campaign, claimed that "The British left us with deep and bleeding wounds, but the Americans stabbed us in the heart."[36]
The attacks on oil targets meant the Luftwaffe scarcely had enough fuel for combat operations, which meant virtually none for training.
Of course, for you, that is just another uncaused effect.
Crickets.
ReplyDelete