On my last trip, my First Officer had just come from doing flight test for Boeing, and was an AF test pilot and B-2 pilot previous to that.
He completely agreed with my assessment -- the pilots crashed completely flyable airplanes due to deficiencies in training and execution.
He also criticized Boeing for creating a failure path that greatly increased the likelihood of this situation, and an internal culture that impeded communication amongst the different components of the development process.
It was too late. Flight 302 nose-dived at nearly the speed of sound, hitting the ground with such force that an airliner with 157 people aboard was largely reduced to fragments no bigger than a man’s arm.
There's your problem right there. The pilots completely failed to fly the airplane -- not only did they grossly mismanage thrust, they never twigged that fact.
In designing the flight controls for the 737 MAX, Boeing assumed that pilots trained on existing safety procedures should be able to sift through the jumble of contradictory warnings and take the proper action 100% of the time within four seconds.
Bullshit. Utter nonsense. Bollocks. Gell-Mann amnesia on stilts.
Per my Boeing flight test First Officer, Boeing counted on pilots being able to correctly apply long standing procedures for uncommanded pitch trim. (Just like I told you previously.)
But since you are such an aviation genius, you will of course be able to tell us why the Ethiopian plane was going so fast, and what affect that would have on control loads.
On my last trip, my First Officer had just come from doing flight test for Boeing, and was an AF test pilot and B-2 pilot previous to that.
ReplyDeleteHe completely agreed with my assessment -- the pilots crashed completely flyable airplanes due to deficiencies in training and execution.
He also criticized Boeing for creating a failure path that greatly increased the likelihood of this situation, and an internal culture that impeded communication amongst the different components of the development process.
It was too late. Flight 302 nose-dived at nearly the speed of sound, hitting the ground with such force that an airliner with 157 people aboard was largely reduced to fragments no bigger than a man’s arm.
There's your problem right there. The pilots completely failed to fly the airplane -- not only did they grossly mismanage thrust, they never twigged that fact.
In designing the flight controls for the 737 MAX, Boeing assumed that pilots trained on existing safety procedures should be able to sift through the jumble of contradictory warnings and take the proper action 100% of the time within four seconds.
Bullshit. Utter nonsense. Bollocks. Gell-Mann amnesia on stilts.
Per my Boeing flight test First Officer, Boeing counted on pilots being able to correctly apply long standing procedures for uncommanded pitch trim. (Just like I told you previously.)
But since you are such an aviation genius, you will of course be able to tell us why the Ethiopian plane was going so fast, and what affect that would have on control loads.
As if.
It is certainly true that Boeing lied from the start about its behavior and continues to do so.
ReplyDeleteIt is certainly true that this sentence is the consequence of unreasoning hatred and impenetrable ignorance.